I work where the
network meets the real world.
I spend my days programming radios that first responders depend on when everything else has failed. That work taught me something most cybersecurity people learn from a textbook: in operational technology, downtime isn't an inconvenience — it's a body count.
For three years I've been studying ICS/OT security as a discipline — the protocols, the threat actors, the chronic under-investment in visibility across critical infrastructure. I recently completed The Washington Center's Cybersecurity Accelerator, where I narrowed my focus to industrial control systems and the specific challenge of defending environments that were never designed to be defended.
Dead Reckoning exists because the ICS/OT security conversation happens mostly behind closed doors — in vendor briefings, NDAs, and language inaccessible to the technicians who actually run these systems. I'm building this in public. Documenting what I learn, analyzing what I find, and calling out what the industry gets wrong.
I don't have a decade of SCADA experience. What I have is a technician's instinct for how these systems actually behave, and a researcher's eye for where they break. That combination is rarer than it sounds.
First responder communications
Cybersecurity Program
Critical infrastructure defense
- Threat actor tracking — APT groups targeting energy infrastructure
- Vulnerability analysis — CVEs in energy sector ICS products
- Protocol security — DNP3, Modbus, IEC 61850 and how they break
For tips, collaboration, or to tell me I'm wrong —
reach out at https://www.linkedin.com/in/bsuar/